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I. INTRODUCTION
Liberation war guerrillas' quest for official recognition of their war
sacrifices and contributions has occupied a prominent role in post-
independence politics in Zimbabwe. Veterans1 have appealed to the
government for employment, promotions, business loans, land, pensions, and
positions in the ruling party and government. Focusing on veterans'
pensions, this article addresses the two key themes of the Ohio State Journal
on Dispute Resolution's 2004 Symposium: post-conflict dispute resolution
and nation-building. In particular, it asks how the ruling party attempted to
resolve conflicts over veterans' pensions, why the party responded the way it
did, and how the conflicts and mode of conflict resolution affected nation-
building. Initially prepared for a panel entitled "Post-Conflict Reparations,"
this article also addresses the issue of whether veterans' pensions represent
reparations.
Disability pensions for guerrilla veterans were the product of a 1980
government initiative to incorporate the veterans into an existing scheme
from which they had been excluded. In contrast, the recognition of war
service years for the purposes of calculating retirement pensions for those in
state employment in 1989 and 1990 resulted from veterans' pressure on the
ruling party. Likewise, veterans won gratuities and monthly pensions as
compensation for their war services from the ruling party in 1997. Mindful of
veterans' power to undermine its own legitimacy and power, the ruling
party's chief response to veterans' demands was to accommodate them.
However, appeasing veterans encouraged them to demand further official
recognition. Moreover, government concessions spurred fresh demands from
excluded groups-notably veterans' subgroups and less powerful civilian
liberation groups such as former political prisoners and detainees--on the
grounds that their war suffering and contributions were comparable to that of
veterans. Similarly, those disabled through accidents or at birth sought
benefits comparable with those of war-disabled veterans, arguing that war-
1 The terms guerrilla veterans, ex-guerrillas, and ex-combatants are used
interchangeably. The term "war veteran" of the liberation struggle was first introduced
and defined in the War Veterans Act of 1992, Section 2, as those who had undergone
military training outside the country between January 1, 1962 and February 29, 1980.
War Veterans Act, § 2 (1992) (Zimb.).
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disabilities should not be privileged over other types of disabilities. When the
government imposed the cost of veterans' compensation on already heavily
taxed workers, the stage was set for a still broader conflict. Veterans' pension
conflicts thus entailed contestation over the relative values of contributions to
the liberation struggle and the distribution of pension costs. Because the
liberation struggle was the central legitimating and nation-building symbol of
the ruling party, these pension conflicts constantly called into question the
party's legitimacy and the nation's unity. Veterans' pensions fit uneasily with
widely shared understandings of reparations, but the case is made for
transitional justice studies to find a way of incorporating veterans and their
demands as key components of transitions.
Veterans' power, the driving force behind the ruling party's frequent
resort to accommodation of veterans' demands, is the subject of Part II. Part
III centers on three major pension benefits: the War Victims Compensation
Act of 1980, the recognition of war service years for the purposes of
calculating retirement pensions for state-employed veterans in 1989 and
1990, and gratuities and monthly pensions for all veterans in 1997. For each
pension benefit, the objectives are to highlight how the ruling party's
attempts to accommodate the powerful veterans' demands stimulated fresh
equity and distributive conflicts. Political competition among liberation war
activists, all claiming the status of victims of official neglect and asserting
their superior war contributions and heroism, put at risk the ruling party's
legitimacy, itself centered on a version of heroes of the liberation struggle.
Part IV takes up the issue of pensions as reparations following the discussion
of the 1997 compensation payments.
I. VETERANS' POWER
The ruling party's strategies of building legitimate power, themselves
deeply influenced by the legacy of the 1979 peace settlement, empowered
veterans. 2 The Lancaster House settlement left intact the three mutually
hostile armies-the two guerrilla armies, ZIPRA and ZANLA, and the
Rhodesian defense forces.3 The smaller guerrilla army, ZIPRA, was loyal to
Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU party and drew most of its recruits from Ndebele and
2 NORMA J. KRIGER, GUERRILLA VETERANS IN POST-WAR ZIMBABWE: SYMBOLIC
AND VIOLENT POLITcs: 1980-1987, at 186-87 (2003).
3 ZIPRA stands for Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army; ZANLA for
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army. The Lancaster House settlement
comprised agreements on a cease-fire in the anti-colonial war, a transitional government,
and a new Constitution. See id. at 36-39.
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Kalanga speakers in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. The larger
guerrilla force, ZANLA, was loyal to Robert Mugabe's ZANU(PF), and was
composed chiefly of Shona-speakers. 4 Spread across the rural areas in
assembly camps, the guerrillas remained armed, concentrated, and under
their own commanders. In principle, the cease-fire agreement recognized the
de facto equality of the three armed forces during the cease-fire, but the
constitutional agreement recognized only the Rhodesian forces. The new
constitution also retained intact the other white-dominated state
institutions-the police and the bureaucracy-and imposed stringent
protections on private property and state pensions.
In the ruling party's attempts to secure control of state institutions, the
ex-guerrillas played an important role. To build military power, the ruling
party integrated the three armies under a single guerrilla-controlled command
structure. The strategy of treating all three armies as de facto equals was
intended to prevent civil war between the two guerrilla armies and to avoid
the perception of a Rhodesian victory that might have been implied by the
maintenance of the Rhodesian forces. De facto equality of the forces meant
that guerrillas were paid the salaries of Rhodesian soldiers, both in the
assembly camps and in the military integration exercise. In 1981, when the
ruling party reversed its policy that every guerrilla had the right to join the
new army, guerrillas who demobilized were paid a black Rhodesian private's
monthly salary for two years. 5 To build bureaucratic power, the ruling party
hired former guerrillas over more educated candidates who had not fought in
the war, and created new posts for many guerrillas unable to meet the formal
educational qualifications.
The ruling party's attempt to treat the two rival liberation armies even-
handedly was compromised by its desire to form a party-state. The practice
of favoring ZANLA cadres (and especially men over women) with
government positions and promotions, already evident in 1980, became more
marked in 1982. The small band of politically motivated ZIPRA dissidents
who opposed ZANU(PF) rule grew, chiefly in response to the ruling party's
hostile actions against them and their party. Though there were never more
than 400 dissidents in Matabeleland and the Midlands, the ruling party
4 ZANU(PF)-Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)-has been the
name of the ruling party since the political campaign for the 1980 election. ZAPU
(Zimbabwe African People's Union) changed its name to PF-ZAPU (Patriotic Front-
Zimbabwe African People's Union). The Unity Accord, signed on December 22, 1987,
merged PF-ZAPU into ZANU(PF). The new party became ZANU PF. JoHN MAKUMBE &
DANIEL COMPAGNON, BEHIND THE SMOKESCREEN: THE POLrrIcs OF ZIMBABWE'S 1995
GENERAL ELECTIONS 2 (2000).
5 See KRIGER, supra note 2, at 70.
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embarked on a brutal campaign against all ZAPU, ZIPRA, and Ndebele
civilians. Some ZIPRA officers were driven out of the army by ZANLA
underlings who refused to recognize their authority, and many more rank-
and-file ZIPRA deserted or opted to demobilize rather than endure often
brutal discrimination. Outside the army, ZIPRA, who had benefited from
preferential hiring in local government institutions in Matabeleland, became
targets of the ruling party's security forces. Demobilized ZIPRA cadres often
forsook collecting their two-year monthly payments from post offices rather
than risk being identified and victimized. By the time of the Unity Accord in
1987, which merged ZAPU into ZANU(PF), the ruling party had
consolidated its state power. It had established a ZANLA-controlled army
and police force, and an African-controlled bureaucracy.
To construct and legitimate the new nation, the ruling party introduced
symbols centered on heroes of the liberation struggle.6 In mid-1980, the
government introduced Heroes' Days, a new two-day public holiday (later
reduced to a single day), to commemorate those who fought and died fighting
for freedom and independence. Soon after, the ruling party announced that
Heroes' Acre, a 57-hectare plot close to the capital, would be the site of a
new national monument to celebrate the annual Heroes' Days and to bury
national heroes-a posthumous status for leaders who had contributed to
Zimbabwe's liberation and independence and who would contribute to its
subsequent development. In terms of the National Heroes' Dependents
Assistance Act of 1984, national heroes' spouses were entitled to generous
pensions and housing allowances, and their children were entitled to tuition
and allowances. Just as the ruling party desired a party-based state, its
selection of national heroes and commemoration practices on Heroes' Days
revealed its preference for a party-based nation. This meant favoring
ZANU(PF) over ZAPU party cadres until 1987, and incorporating (including
retroactively) former ZAPU cadres after 1987. The party's selection of
national heroes also demonstrated its preference for high-ranking male
political and military leaders. Further evidence of hierarchical values, the
ruling party encouraged people outside the capital to build provincial and
local heroes' acres for the burial and celebration of lesser heroes.
Veterans' power, itself differentiated by factors such as political
affiliation, employment, post-war rank, and gender, derives in critical ways
from early state and nation-building strategies of the ruling party. Preferential
hiring and promotions in the uniformed services - the army, the police, and
6 See KRIGER, supra note 2, at 64-65; Norma J. Kriger, The Politics of Creating
National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity, in SOLDIERS
IN ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION WAR 139-63 (Ngwabi Bhebe & Terence Ranger eds., 1995).
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the prison services-and the bureaucracy gave ex-guerrillas an institutional
power base. The practice of treating the guerrillas as the de facto equals of
the Rhodesian soldiers became a powerful symbolic appeal for guerrillas in
their struggles over state pensions. Especially after 1987, Heroes' Day
commemorations and the frequent naming of national heroes provided
opportunities for guerrillas to assert the ruling party's neglect of their
heroism. Guerrillas' training in violence and political mobilization inspired
fear, and thus further boosted their symbolic and potential coercive power.
Lastly, following the merger of the two rival political parties, demobilized
veterans banded together to form a national veterans' association. The
institutional, coercive, symbolic, and organizational sources of veterans'
power vis- -vis the ruling party help to explain why the ruling party resorted
again and again to accommodation to cope with veterans' demands, the
subject of the next section.
III. CONFLICT-ACCOMMODATION-CONFLICT
A. War-Disability Pensions
Modeled on the Victims of Terrorism (Compensation) Act, the War
Victims Compensation Act of 1980 provided for pensions for war-related
injuries or deaths and for medical and vocational rehabilitation for the war-
disabled. It was designed to incorporate the former guerrillas and their
civilian supporters who had been excluded from the Rhodesian regime's
scheme. 7 The calculation of disability pensions was based on the degree of
disablement and on earnings at the time of injury or death. The method of
assessing earnings for ex-guerrillas, who had performed "unpaid combatant
duties," differed from that for civilians who had no earnings. 8 The earnings
of guerrillas were to be equated with those of Rhodesian soldiers of
comparable rank and seniority at the time of death or injury.9 Unemployed
civilians' earnings were assessed using minimum wages. Guerrillas were
thus privileged over unemployed civilians. The new law contained other
important differences. Whereas its predecessor had referred to "acts of
terrorism," the new law defined "the war" as "the armed conflict which
occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries between the 23rd
7 War Victims Compensation Bill, Second Reading, col. 1087 (Sept. 30, 1980)
(Zimb.) (providing the responsible minister's explanation of the motives behind the bill
to parliament).
8 War Victim's Compensation Act, No. 22, § 27(3) (1980) (Zimb.).
91d.
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December, 1972, and the 29th February, 1980, in connexion [sic] with the
bringing about of, or resistance to, political and social change in
Zimbabwe."10 The new law also excluded compensation for war-related
property damages and losses on the grounds that they would be impossible to
verify and would be too costly, given that all Africans had sacrificed for
liberation.11
Ex-combatants challenged key provisions in the Act to try to augment
their disability payments, which they regarded as inadequate compensation
for their war sacrifices. They won repeated administrative reinterpretations
and legal amendments. Responding to ex-combatants' outrage at the link
between pensions and their often low degrees of disablement, in April 1981,
Prime Minister Mugabe issued a directive to the social welfare office to pay
the disabled ex-guerrillas a Z$600 demobilization gratuity that would be
unrelated to their disabilities. 12 In 1981, mainly ZANLA disabled ex-
combatants, still living in a temporary facility in Harare, rejected their first
pension checks as too small in relation to their war services. They detained
the social welfare pensions officer and the two ex-guerrillas he had brought
with him when he came to pay the disabled ex-combatants. In June 1981, the
Deputy Director of Social Services directed staff to assess guerrilla earnings
on the much higher European, rather than African soldiers', pay scale. 13 In
late 1985, a few hundred ex-combatants met in Bindura, Mashonaland
Central, to discuss their grievances, including their much lower disability
pensions than those for whites in the former Rhodesian army. Following the
social welfare pensions officer's proposal to use specific provisions in the
War Victims Compensation Act to remedy existing inequities, guerrillas'
assessed earnings were recalculated to include their seniority (years of
service) and "potential" or non-cash earnings (bonuses and uniform
allowances). 14 Ex-combatants were not appeased.
10 War Victim's Compensation Act, § 2 (1980) (Zimb.).
11 War Victims Compensation Bill, Second Reading, cols. 1092, 1104 (Sept. 30,
1980) (Zimb.); War Victims Compensation Bill, Committee Stage, col. 1194 (Oct. 2,
1980) (Zimb.).
12 Interview with Victor Makwavarara, Social Welfare Pensions Officer, Pensions
Office, in Mukwati Building, Harare, Zimbabwe (Aug. 24, 1992); War Disabled to
Receive Z$600 Each, CHRONICLE (Zimb.), Apr. 29, 1981, at 1; Editorial, Help for the
Disabled, CHRONICLE (Zimb.), Apr. 30, 1981, at 10.
13 Interview with Victor Makwavarara, supra note 12; All the War Disabled to Get
Pensions, CHRONICLE (Zimb.), June 27, 1981, at 1.
14 Ex-fighters Meet to Press for Government Jobs, HERALD (Zimb.), Sept. 17, 1985,
at 5; Letter from Victor Makwavarara, Social Welfare Pensions Officer, to D.D.
Sanyangore, Director of Social Services, Department of Social Welfare files, Sept. 17,
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Disabled ex-combatants, predominantly severely injured ZANLA men
who were living at Ruwa Rehabilitation Center, communicated their
grievances in a letter to Prime Minister Mugabe in September 1986.15 A rare
opportunity to hear ex-combatants' voices in the period from 1980 to 1987,
the letter highlighted what the fighters saw as major inequities. Their leaders
had enriched themselves, violating the party's socialist ideology and
leadership code. Yet, the leaders dismissed the fighters' calls for assistance,
telling the veterans they had not fought for money. Their former Rhodesian
enemies also enjoyed a social and economic status that was superior to that
of the veterans. Their deceased leaders had national hero status and their
dependants enjoyed state assistance, whereas the rank-and-file disabled ex-
combatants who died had no status, and their dependents did not receive state
benefits. Labeling themselves "liberators," the disabled ex-combatants
objected to being called "war victims" in the disability pensions legislation.' 6
They asked for appropriate recognition-larger disability pensions, pensions
for their dependants and burial expenses as official national heroes received,
life pensions, a well-paid job, allowances for the unemployed, housing in
areas specially designated for them, free medical and dental care, and free
schooling for the children of deceased ex-combatants.17
In October 1986, Ruwa ex-combatants took hostage the social welfare
pensions officer and other bureaucrats who had been sent to discuss the ex-
combatants' grievances about the compensation scheme. Prime Minister
Mugabe, whom they demanded to see, was out of town. Deputy Prime
Minister, Simon Muzenda, told the social welfare pensions officer: "Find a
way of paying them." 18 The officer found a provision in the legislation to pay
vocational training allowances to the disabled.1 9 Though the rehabilitation
center did not have a certified training program, the deputy premier issued a
directive to pay the war-disabled at Ruwa monthly training allowances and
1985 (on file with author); Letter from Victor Makwavarara, Social Welfare Pensions
Officer, to Editor, PARADE (Zimb.), Apr. 6, 1990 (on file with author).
15 Zimbabwe had a Westminster political system until the end of 1987, when it
became a presidential system with the president exercising unusually extensive powers.
Robert Mugabe was the prime minister from 1980 to 1987, after which he became the
president. MAKUMBE & COMPAGNON, supra note 4, at 33.
16 The Ruwa Document (Sept. 14, 1986) (on file with the Catholic Commission for
Justice and Peace in Harare, Zimbabwe, and with author).
17 Id.
18 Interview with Victor Makwavarara, supra note 12.
19 Id.
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back payments.20 While Ruwa ex-combatants were detaining government
officials at Ruwa, other residents had hijacked Ruwa's bus to visit a former
war commander, the Minister of State (Defense) and acting Minister of
Labour and Social Welfare.21 Within days, the army evicted the disabled
from Ruwa and closed the institution.22 This instance of official repression
was unusual in the context of ex-combatants' pensions demands.
Ex-combatants' demands continued to be accommodated. In 1988, the
legislation was amended to allow for the commutation of pensions (i.e.,
lump-sum rather than monthly payments) in cases where the degrees of
disability were low and permanent or the amounts of money were small, thus
removing another difference between the legislation catering to ex-guerrillas
and that for former Rhodesian army personnel. Unlike the latter act, the
amendment gave the minister the discretion to approve the right of
commutation in other cases as well, provided there were compelling "special
circumstances." 23 In practice, all ex-combatants who applied had their
pensions automatically commuted.24 In 1992, a decision was made to pay
disabled ex-guerrillas pensions calculated at the higher rate, a provision in
the law applicable when the disabled were compelled by their injury to
change their profession or standard of living. 25 The army's medical
directorate was instructed to re-examine the disabled so that those found with
injuries too severe to have enabled them to join the army at independence
could qualify for pensions at the higher rate. No such examinations ever
occurred; all applicants were automatically approved for the higher benefit.
When the High Court and the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe subsequently
ruled that disabled former guerrillas did not meet the statutory provisions for
pensions at the higher rate, 26 the pensions office did not change its practices.
20 Id. For the discretionary power of Commissioner of War Victims Compensation
to determine whether a war-disabled person should receive vocational training, inter alia,
see War Victims Compensation Act, No. 22, § 12(3) (1980) (Zimb.).
21 Some Ruwa ex-combatants told the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
about events leading up to their eviction and the eviction itself (notes on file with the
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Harare, Zimbabwe).
22 Id.
23 War Victims Compensation Amendment Act, No. 13 (1988) (Zimb.); see also 15
HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, cols. 203-04 (July 14, 1988) (Zimb.); 15 HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY DEBATES, cols. 280-81 (July 19, 1988) (Zimb.).
24 Interview with Victor Makwavarara, supra note 12.
25 War Victims Compensation Act, No. 22, § 8(1)(b) (1980) (Zimb.).
26 In the matter of Zaranyika v. Commissioner for War Victims Compensation,
Judgment No. S.C.51/94 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (Zimb.) (record on appeal from the judgment of
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In 1995, responding to the veterans' association's claim that many rural
ex-combatants had not even heard of the compensation scheme, the
government set aside over Z$200 million to cover another round of medical
assessments of war-disabled ex-combatants. 27 There was a dramatic rise in
new disability claims, almost all from ex-combatants: 1,000 in 1994, 6,000 in
1995, 9,000 in 1996, and 9,500 for the first nine months of 1997. State
expenditures on the compensation scheme also jumped from Z$353 million
in 1995 to Z$606 million in 1996.28 Most new claims were for post-traumatic
stress disorder, whereas prior claims had been for physical disability.
Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi, the veterans' association chairman and also a
government medical doctor, played a pivotal role in facilitating access to the
compensation scheme. Besides distributing application forms across the
country, he often signed claimants' medical forms, usually without
conducting an exam.29 In March 1997, the independent media reported
fraudulent claims involving top party and government officials (many of
them ex-combatants) and widespread corruption. The government stopped
payments of pensions approved for commutation because they involved the
largest sums of money. 30 In July 1997, the government appointed a
commission to investigate the compensation scheme. Ex-combatants and
others in top posts in the defense forces, the bureaucracy, and parliament
who were called before the commission typically defended their high rates of
disability and payments, saying they had fought for money and deserved
greater compensation. 31 Meanwhile, the veterans' association organized
often violent public protests against the looting of the fund, the freeze on
paying approved commuted pensions, and the composition and public
the Honorable Sandura JP in the High Court of Zimbabwe at Harare Civil Term on Sept.
1, 1993).
27 War Vets Happy at Compensation, CHRONICLE (Zimb.), Nov. 14, 1995, at 2;
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the War Victims
Compensation Act, ch. 11.16, at 17 (May 1998) (Zimb.). The Commission, sympathetic
to the veterans, did not accept the view that the compensation scheme had been kept
secret until 1993.
28 See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the War
Victims Compensation Act, ch. 11.16, Annexes m11 & IV (May 1998) (Zimb.).
29 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the War Victims
Compensation Act, ch. 11.16, at 9, 13-14 (May 1998) (Zimb.).
30 See, e.g., Govt Suspends War Veterans' Compensation, CHRONICLE (Zimb.), Mar.
26, 1997, at 1; Officials Abuse Compensation Act, CHRONICLE (Zimb.), Mar. 6, 1997, at
1.
31 E.g., Nomsa Nkala, 'Inquiry Not Necessary', HERALD (Zimb.), Aug. 21, 1997, at
1.
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hearings of the commission. They also renewed demands for compensation
for their war services. 32
In May 1998, the commission's report appeared. Chaired by party
loyalist Judge Chidyausiku, the commission took the view that most
prominent people whom it interviewed had manipulated rather than broken
the law-they had legitimate, albeit often grossly exaggerated, war-related
injuries. The commission explained how the veterans' association had turned
to the compensation scheme to seek the recognition for their war services
that had been denied to them. The War Veterans Act of 1992 had provided
for state assistance to veterans, defined as those who had military training
outside the country between January 1962 and February 1980.33 However,
year after year, the Treasury refused to fund veterans' schemes. Frustrated,
veterans had turned to the compensation fund, which was financed from the
Consolidated Revenue Fund and was thus independent of Treasury
approval. 34 The commission accepted the legitimacy of the ex-combatants'
grievances about lack of official recognition for their war services and
restated the basis of ex-combatants' discontent. Ex-combatants did not
receive a salary or pension during the war while the Rhodesian soldiers did,
and they (ex-combatants) had endured greater hardships-not having
transport or adequate food, clothing, and ammunition. Moreover, they had
sacrificed opportunities to advance their education while those who had
stayed behind during the war had received an education and were better off
than those who had gone to fight.35 By the time the commission's report was
published, veterans had won compensation for their war services.
While ex-combatants felt their disability pensions were inadequate
recognition of their national service, other groups sought equity with the war-
disabled. These groups' claims challenged the special status of liberation
service. Those disabled other than as a result of the war were not persuaded
of the distinctiveness of the war-disabled. In 1995, the president of an
organization for the disabled, who depended on meager and irregular public
assistance, called on the government to extend the scheme for the war-
disabled to all the disabled, saying it did not matter whether disability had
been sustained "during war or through witchcraft. ' 36 That same year, a
32 See infra Parts IH.B & III.C.
33 War Veterans Act (1992) (Zimb.).
34 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the War Victims
Compensation Act, ch. 11.16, at 7, 17 (May 1998) (Zimb.).
31 Id. at 7-8.
36 Disabled Demand Pension Scheme, FINANCIAL GAZETTE (Zimb.), Sept. 7, 1995,
at 8.
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member of parliament, who was appointed by the president to represent the
interests of the disabled, reiterated the plea for the disabled to get pensions
"pegged at the same level as the pension being given to the war wounded,"
since "disability is disability irrespective of the cause. '37 Others sought to
broaden the category of "war victims" to include victims of more recent wars
in the 1980s. Members of parliament from Manicaland called for the
compensation scheme to cover victims of the war involving the Mozambican
guerrilla organization against the Zimbabwe-supported Frelimo government
forces. Members of parliament from Matabeleland and the Midlands
proposed the inclusion of victims of the government's military campaign
against dissidents in Matabeleland and the Midlands. Both the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation
proposed to the Chidyausiku Commission that the war victims compensation
scheme cover not only the victims of these more recent wars of the 1980s,
but also the victims of human rights abuses generally.38
B. Recognition of War Service Years for the Purpose of Calculating
Retirement Pensions
The idea of pensions to recognize liberation war services was raised at
the outset of independence. If pensions had to be paid to their former
Rhodesian enemies, as the new constitution required, then some members of
parliament proposed pensions for all liberation war activists 39 or for
unemployed demobilized ex-combatants. 40 The idea resurfaced in parliament
in 1987 and 1988, and was then picked up by the official media. Different
views emerged on whether pensions should be for state-employed ex-
combatants, unemployed and destitute ex-combatants, or all ex-combatants. 41
Ex-combatants in the uniformed services were the first to win
recognition for their war service years. If members of the army, a branch of
the uniformed services, served twenty years or until the age of fifty, the state
37 22 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, at 110-11 (May 18, 1995) (Zimb.).
38 17 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, col. 353 (June 19, 1990) (Zimb.); Report of
the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the War Victims Compensation
Act, ch. 11.16, at 63-64 (May 1998) (Zimb.).
39 Dr. Nhiwatiwa, MP, 2 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, cols. 776-77 (Sept. 9,
1980) (Zimb.).
4 0 Mr. Mguni, MP, 2 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, COIs. 1035-36 (Sept. 18, 1980)
(Zimb.).
41 Mr. Mpofu, MP, 14 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, col. 2412 (Nov. 11, 1987)
(Zimb.); Call to Reward Ex-fighters, CHRONICLE (Zimb.), Mar. 24, 1988, at 11; Editorial,
Living Heroes, SUNDAY NEWS (Zimb.), Mar. 27, 1988, at 6.
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doubled their pension contributions when they retired. Ex-combatants
complained that their years of service were only counted from 1980 whereas
Rhodesian soldiers counted their war service years. In March 1989, ex-
combatants in the uniformed services won recognition for their years of war
service. In the absence of records, age was used as a proxy for war service
years. 42 Excluded ex-combatants were outraged. Similar benefits, though less
generous, were extended to ex-combatants in the civil service in December
1989 and in parliament in 1990.4 3 The timing of these concessions probably
had to do with the upcoming elections. A new party, led by a man who had
been a ZANLA guerrilla, and also the former secretary-general of
ZANU(PF) and a government minister, raised the possibility of attracting the
ruling party's previously secure ex-combatant support base.
Ex-combatants who received these benefits objected to having to wait
until they retired to receive them. Many ex-combatants were dying young of
diseases-AIDS, though not explicitly mentioned, was taking its toll-and
they wanted immediate monetary recognition. 44 Recognizing the war service
years of ex-combatants employed in the uniformed services, the civil service,
and parliament infuriated ex-combatants who were excluded. The
government defended its actions on economic grounds-if it legislated that
the private sector provide comparable benefits, employers would lay off ex-
combatants.45 The responsible minister promised that a long-awaited
National Social Security scheme would take care of pensions for the rest of
the ex-combatants. 46 Both the minister and his deputy seemed to recognize
the urgency of redressing inequities in the recognition of war service years,
especially for unemployed ex-combatants, in debates on versions of a bill for
state assistance to war veterans. The minister favored a pension for
unemployed ex-combatants when they reached the retirement age of 55
42 Statutory Instrument 53A of 1989 (amending the State Service (Pensions)
(Uniformed Forces) Regulations 1976).
43 Statutory Instrument 285 of 1989 (amending the Public Service (Pensions)
Regulations 1980 published in Statutory Instrument 849 of 1980); Officers of Parliament
(Pensions) Amendment Rules, No. 9 (1990).
44 See, e.g., Mrs. Dongo, ex-combatant and MP, 18 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES,
cols. 472-73 (July 16, 1991) (Zimb.).
45 Minister of Labour and Social Services, 18 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, cols.
2919-20 (Nov. 20, 1991) (Zimb.); 16 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, cols. 672-74 (Aug.
2, 1989) (Zimb.).
46 Minister of Labour and Social Services, 18 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, cols.
2919-20 (Nov. 20, 1991) (Zimb.); 16 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, cols. 672-74 (Aug.
2, 1989) (Zimb.).
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years. 47 In December 1995, with elections pending the following year, the
ruling party announced it would pay life pensions for all ex-combatants
excluded from the 1989 and 1990 pensions benefits. In preparation, another
round of vetting was set in motion to ensure that only genuine ex-fighters
benefited.48 Government promises remained unfulfilled.
C. Gratuities and Monthly Life Pensions
In the midst of the protests over the suspension of war-disability
pensions and the commission's hearings to investigate alleged fraud, the
veterans' association pushed for the long-awaited war service recognition
and also other benefits. It did not seek merely the redress of an inequity
among ex-combatants, but compensation for all ex-combatants. The
association claimed that ex-combatants had never received any recognition
for their liberation of the nation. The veterans' association demanded a
Z$500,000 tax-free gratuity or lump-sum pension and a Z$2,000 tax-free
monthly pension, free education and free health services for all ex-
combatants and their dependants, and funds for projects. Ex-combatants also
sought preferential admission into educational institutions and preferential
access to housing, residential and business stands, government employment,
and land.
On August 21, 1997, President Mugabe conceded a gratuity of Z$50,000
and a Z$2,000 monthly life pension for each ex-combatant, free education
and health services for ex-combatants and their dependants, funds for
business projects, funeral expenses, and twenty percent of future land
resettlement plots. 49 The President reportedly said: "There is a greater
readiness than there has ever been to assist you .... We will find the money
for this and we can even borrow if we need to. Have you ever heard of a
country that has collapsed because of borrowing?" 50 He took the blame for
47 War Veterans Administration Bill: Memorandum from Minister of Labour,
Manpower Planning, and Social Welfare (undated); Deputy Minister of Labour,
Manpower Planning, and Social Welfare, 18 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, col. 5222
(Apr. 7, 1992) (Zimb.).
48 Letter from Mezhdyarodnaya, Njube, Bulawayo, to Editor, at 1 (Mar. 31, 1996)
(on file with author).
49 These benefits were provided under the War Veterans Act in terms of Statutory
Instrument 281 of 1997. ZIMBABWE GOv'T GAZETrE (Supp.), Dec. 12, 1997. Veterans'
pensions could be inherited by their spouses and children up until 18 years. Id.
50 Mugabe Bows to Ex-Combatants' Demands, Order... Huge Payout for Ex-
Fighters. Veterans to Get $50,000 Lump Sums, Free Education, Health, FIN. GAZETTE
(Zimb.), Aug. 28, 1997.
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"the dire circumstances of poverty and begging that characterized the lives of
many an ex-combatant. ' '51 He thanked ex-combatants for their party loyalty
and called on them to revitalize the party. 52 Ex-combatants accepted the
Z$50,000 gratuity only after the President promised to review it later. For
some perspective on the value of compensation payments, an official
estimate in 1998 was that seventy percent of the urban population earned less
than Z$2,000 per month. The Z$50,000 gratuity was equivalent to the annual
salaries of the lowest paid air traffic controllers, who are skilled workers.
53
Mugabe had defused arguably the biggest threat to his power since 1980.
Indicating their tacit support for veterans' demands, the ex-combatant-led
army and police forces had uncharacteristically refrained from intervening to
end the often violent protests of the demobilized ex-combatants.
Before long, representatives of the veterans' association dismissed the
payments as "peanuts," amidst often violent protests and threatened
violence.54 In 1999, veterans won a 21% increase in their life pensions.
55
Despite a chronic economic crisis, life pensions, along with other state
pensions paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, are continually
increased to try to maintain their value against extraordinarily high inflation,
underscoring the ruling party's determination to retain ex-combatants'
political loyalty. In December 2002, veterans' life pensions were Z$8,000 per
month.56 They were increased to Z$9,722 in 2003, backdated to July 2002. In
January 2003, their pensions were raised to Z$17,500 per month.57 While the
real value of pensions has been seriously eroded by inflation, by the end of
2003, the retirement pensions of most workers were no more than Z$15,000
per month.58
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 For statistics on earnings that offer perspective on the size of pensions, see
Commission Warns Air Traffic Controllers Over Planned Strike, THE STANDARD (Zimb.),
Dec. 21, 1997.
54 War Vets Now Shameless Mercenaries, ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, June 12, 1998.
55 Id.; Ex-Combatants Make Impossible Demands, AFRIKA NEWS NETWoRK, July
21, 1999; Mahachi's Tstotsis Can Really Run, ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 22, 1999;
Minister Escapes War Vets, THE STANDARD (Zimb.), Mar. 28, 1999; War Vets Want
$500,000 Each, THE STANDARD (Zimb.), Mar. 14, 1999; War Vets Want Mangwende Out,
THE STANDARD (Zimb.), Mar. 21, 1999; Editorial, When Heroes Turn into Villains, THE
STANDARD (Zimb.), Apr. 19, 1998.
56 Lloyd Mudina, Zanu PF Agrees to Pay Gratuities to Ex-Detainees, DAILY NEWS
(Zimb.), Dec. 16, 2002.
57 War Veterans Pensions Up 80%, DAILY NEWS (Zimb.), Feb. 3, 2003.
58 Pensioners Hurt by Record Inflation, IRIN, Dec. 26, 2003.
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How to pay for the 50,000 veterans' gratuities and life pensions, which
were estimated to cost Z$5 billion, triggered conflict with organized workers
and even the ruling party's own usually docile parliamentarians. The World
Bank suspended balance of payments support until the government could
account for how it would pay for the unbudgeted scheme. 59 In December
1997, the government increased taxes on electricity, fuel, and goods and
services, and introduced a new war veterans' levy on wages and salaries.
Direct and indirect taxes already absorbed more than fifty percent of basic
formal sector wages and salaries. 60 A day after organized workers
demonstrated against the tax increases, the government officially withdrew
the war veterans' levy and promised to remove the tax increases on
electricity and fuel in early 1998.61 After a two-day nationwide stay-away in
March 1998 and threats of a longer one in September, the government
announced it would withdraw the sales tax increases in November 1998.62 In
these conflicts, whites took the side of the workers because they too felt that
large payments to veterans hurt their economic interests. The government's
subsequent announcement that it intended to compulsorily acquire designated
white-owned farms only exacerbated the anxieties of the whites.
The gratuities and life pensions also intensified conflicts among former
allies in the liberation movement. Ever since the War Veterans Act of 1992
had made military training outside the country a crucial component of the
definition of "veterans," former political prisoners, detainees, and restrictees
had sought to be included in the definition of "veterans." 63 Well-represented
in parliament and in the party leadership, and having their own organization,
they claimed their suffering and contribution to liberation had been equal or
superior to that of the younger fighters, a claim rejected by ex-combatant
parliamentarians who represented about one-third of parliamentarians in
1992.64
59Bid to Mollify Ex-Combatants a Choker for Government, ZIMBABWE
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 19, 1997.
60 People's Power at Last, THE INSIDER (Zimb.), Dec. 10, 1997; New Culture
Develops in Ruling Party, AFRIKA NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 15, 1997.
61 Vehicles Damaged as ZCTU Demonstrations Turn Violent, ZIMBABWE
INDEPENDENT, Dec. 12, 1997.
62 Who the Hell is Tsvangirai?, THE INSIDER (Zimb.), Mar. 17, 1998; Zimbabwe's
Month in Brief, THE INSIDER (Zimb.), Sept. 24, 1998.
63 War Veterans Act, § 2 (1992) (Zimb.).
64 War Veterans Administration Bill, Second Reading, 18 HouSE OF ASSEMBLY
DEBATES (Apr. 2, 1992 & Apr. 7, 1992) (Zimb.). For the estimated number of
parliamentarians who were veterans, see Mrs. Margaret Dongo, MP, War Veterans
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They continue to fight for gratuities and life pensions. In 1998, they were
promised the same benefits as the war veterans. 65 Some 7,000 met the
contentious requirement of at least two years in prison or detention, but the
government reneged on its promises. 66 In December 2002, the ruling party's
annual conference resolved to pay gratuities and pensions to former political
prisoners and detainees. 67 Opening the fifth session of the fifth parliament in
July 2004, President Mugabe announced that the government would
introduce the Zimbabwe Political Ex-Prisoners, Detainees and Restrictees'
Association Bill.68 Meanwhile, war collaborators, the youth who provided
critical logistical support for the guerrillas during the war, and the widows of
veterans who died before the government decision to pay veterans'
compensation continue to demand gratuities and life pensions on equity
grounds.69
Persistent bickering over compensation for war contributions made the
party's attempts at self-legitimation and nation-building controversial.
Liberation war activists competed over whose suffering and heroism was
greatest. This challenged the ruling party's project of building a nation and a
history that celebrates official national heroes. Meanwhile, contestation over
war hero status and compensation invites contempt from the "born-free"
younger generation, workers, and others who find few benefits in
independence. In 2002, Zimbabwean academic Brian Raftopoulos wrote
more generally of the importance of the ruling party's control of the past for
its legitimacy.70
For the ruling elite, the battle for the past is usually as important as the
fight to retain control in the present. This is because the past contains
reservoirs of legitimacy which must be protected from dissenting
Administration Bill, Second Reading, 18 HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, col. 5163 (Apr.
2, 1992) (Zimb.).
65 Mudina, supra note 56.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Presidency Dealing with Land Reform Anomalies, HERALD (Zimb.), July 17,
2004. This bill was introduced in Parliament in October, 2004.
69 Mudina, supra note 56; Sandra Mujokoro, Ex-Detainees Expect to Get $80,000 in
Gratuities, DAILY NEWS (Zimb.), Dec. 19, 2002.
70 Brian Raftopoulos, The Continuing Deadlock in Zimbabwe, FINANCIAL GAZETTE
(Zimb.), Dec. 19, 2002.
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interpretations and enforced as a uniform process of national consciousness,
unfolding in the inevitable victory of the ruling party and its great leader. 71
IV. PENSIONS AS REPARATIONS?
Might the official apology and veterans' compensation payments in 1997
represent reparations? The traditional definition of reparations referred to
material compensation that defeated states were required to pay to victor
states. Recent studies define reparations more broadly to include both
material and non-material redress. Reparations may encompass restitution
(the restoration of the status quo), commemoration, apology, and material
compensation. 72 Rather than reparations being only between states, they now
also involve government redress to its own citizens.
There are at least two different, though often overlapping, sources for
reparation claims. Claims may have a basis in international human rights law
and national legislation. Alternatively, claims may have a moral basis which
address "(f]undamental feelings that justice needs to be done and that harm
needs to be undone." 73 Claims with a basis in law include United States
reparations to Japanese-Americans who were victims of racial prejudice
during World War II, German reparations to Holocaust survivors, Japanese
reparations to "comfort women" for the abuses by the Japanese military
during World War II, and South African reparations for victims of apartheid
who came before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 74 Claims with a
moral basis include attempts to seek redress for unjust and discriminatory
government policies.75 For Elazar Barkan, such "historical injustices"
71 Id.
72 On the evolution of the concept of reparation, see Stef Vandeginste, Reparation,
in RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK 145-47 (David
Bloomfield, et al. eds., 2003). Vandeginste also alludes to how reparation measures used
to be backward-looking, but now include forward-looking measures. Id.
73 Id. at 148.
74 See Theo von Boven, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation
and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993); MARTHA MINOW,
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS
VIOLENCE (1998); CHRISTIAN PROSS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE OVER
REPARATIONS FOR SURVIVING VICTIMS OF THE NAZI TERROR (Belinda Cooper trans.,
1998); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE
CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 61-80, 113-
45, 157-68 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) [hereinafter WHEN SORRY].
75 Vandeginste, supra note 72, at 149.
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include the claims of Australian aborigines and native Americans for
"restitution," his comprehensive term for material and non-material
compensation. 76
Still, precisely what constitutes reparations remains murky. Two
approaches to defining reparations should highlight both significant
differences and commonalities. Posner and Vermeule concede that "there are
no clear conceptual boundaries that demarcate reparations from ordinary
legal remedies, on the one hand, and other large-scale government transfer
programs, on the other."77 Hence, they offer merely a working definition of
reparations that indicates the limits of their project. Ordinary legal remedies
redress identified individual victims for wrongdoing committed by identified
individual perpetrators; reparations may relax one or both of these
requirements. Large-scale transfer payments are forward-looking in their
motivation, seeking to deter future wrongdoing; reparations are more
backward-looking in their justification, aiming to redress past injustices.
Finally, they explicitly exclude cases in which the reparations are paid under
legal compulsion, e.g., a judicial order. They assert that demands for
reparations more typically appeal from the courts to the moral norms held in
society at large.78 Posner and Vermeule further demarcate their interest in
reparations from those paid involuntarily by loser states to victor states after
wars as conditions of peace. Rather, the reparations of interest to them "are
not paid in order to avoid violence or destruction, but to accomplish some
other political or moral purpose, and they are usually paid to individuals or
groups." 79
Asserting a more authoritative definition of reparations, Roy Brooks
contrasts reparations with settlements: The former is a government response
that seeks atonement for a commission of an injustice; in the latter, the
government does not express atonement. "Usually, a reparation is easily
distinguishable from a settlement by the presence or absence of an
accompanying statement of apology." 80 In his stated conditions for the
success of reparations, Brooks asserts that redress must emanate from the
76 See generally ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND
NEGOTIATING HIsTORIcAL INJusTICES (2000).
77 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691 (2003).
78 Id. at 691-93. For understandings of reparations that include forward-looking
motives and a judicial approach, see Vandeginste, supra note 72, at 145, 151-53.
79 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 694.
80 WHEN SORRY, supra note 74, at 9.
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legislature rather than courts on the grounds that legislatures everywhere in
the world have greater law-making authority than courts.
81
Common to both of these otherwise different approaches to defining
reparations is the notion that reparations should not be coerced and should
reflect some societal coming to terms with wrongdoing. Insofar as scholars
consider apology a form of reparation, they emphasize the importance of the
apology being voluntary rather than coerced. 82 Barkan seems to convey a
similar idea when he says restitution (his comprehensive term for
reparations) depends more on moral than power politics. 83 Reparations
should express a genuine desire to redress injustice. This is not to say that
reparations will not depend on politics. For Brooks, one condition for the
success of reparations is that political pressures must be brought to bear on
legislators. Successful redress, he states, will depend on politics rather than
the merit of victims' claims, though victims' claims must be meritorious.
84
Barkan's study of redress for historical injustices also understands that
reparations requires strong political pressure, in which he singles out the
effectiveness of "public shame." 85
How, if at all, does this discussion on reparations relate to veterans'
compensation in 1997? Veterans' claims for compensation for their national
war services had a moral rather than a legal basis. Despite having
successfully liberated the nation from white rule, veterans claimed that the
government had not officially compensated them for their sacrifices. The
core of the veterans' grievances had to do with their sense that they had not
benefited materially from the revolution they had won. Other groups-their
former Rhodesian enemies, their leaders, and those who pursued their
education during the war-had reaped the harvest of independence at the
veterans' expense. Herein lay the root of veterans' sense of injustice.
The case against veterans' payments being reparations might be made on
at least two grounds. In Zimbabwe, the President's acceptance of blame for
those veterans who were impoverished was expressed under duress; he knew
that failure to meet veterans' demands might result in a bloodless coup.86 The
81 Id. at 6.
82 Id. at 114 (citing Nicholas Tavuchis).
83 BARKAN, supra note 76, at 318.
84 WHEN SORRY, supra note 74, at 6.
85 See Vandeginste, supra note 72, at 149 (quoting BARKAN, supra note 76, at 318-
20 (discussing the role of political pressure)).
86 Sam Moyo & Paris Yeros, Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe:
Towards the National Democratic Revolution, in RECLAIMING THE LAND: THE
RESURGENCE OF RURAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA, AsiA, AND LATIN AMERICA (Sam Moyo
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President's lack of sincerity in accepting blame for the predicament of
impoverished veterans was made explicit when, less than a year later, he
criticized the life pensions and gratuities. Before Heroes' Day in 1998, he
told a Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation radio interviewer that, "Nobody
went to the war to be paid. No. Rather, the reward was land. This is what
people fought for." 87 But is Zimbabwe's case any more contradictory than
the notion that reparations are the product of sincere apologies made as a
result of political pressure?
The second reason for caution against viewing veterans' compensation in
1997 as reparations has to do with the validity of the veterans' claim of
official neglect and failure to compensate them for their national services.
The veterans correctly assert that the government never gave them explicit
material compensation for their war services. However, the government had
various policies that effectively compensated them for their war services:
preferential central and local government hiring and promotions, government
job creation for veterans who did not meet the formal educational criteria for
government posts, and demobilization pay for guerrillas (but not for those
black Rhodesians in the army whom the new government labeled
paramilitaries). Moreover, the government had recognized the war service
years of ex-guerrillas in state employment for retirement pensions and
compensated the war-disabled veterans more generously than unemployed
war-disabled civilians. Veterans were not victims of absolute official neglect.
What term would best capture these preferential government policies and
retroactive laws to incorporate veterans?
If veterans were not victims of absolute neglect, how did their post-war
benefits compare with those of other groups? How do you measure benefits,
suffering, and contribution? What are the relevant groups for comparison?
Only rough arguments can be offered. The strongest case against veterans'
claims of official neglect come from comparing their official benefits with
those of other rank-and-file liberation war activists who organized after the
war-the youth, today known as "war collaborators," and former political
detainees, prisoners, and restrictees. 88 Veterans' claims of superior war
contributions and suffering vis-A-vis these groups, as well as others, such as
peasants and the rural African elite, are difficult to sustain. Such claims also
& Paris Yeros eds., forthcoming Apr. 2005). These two authors, both supporters of
ZANU(PF)'s land occupations, agree that veterans' demands in 1997 presented a security
threat to the government because of their prominence in the state security apparatus,
including the President's office.
87 Comrades Shouldn't Have Been Paid, Says Mugabe, THE STANDARD (Zimb.),
Aug. 9, 1998.
88 KRIGER, supra note 2, at 187-88.
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contradict the understanding of guerrilla war as requiring the
interdependence of civilians and fighters and of actually blurring the lines
between military and civilian roles. The veterans' case of neglect is stronger
than that of the economically better-off post-war leadership, educated blacks,
and whites. But other liberation war participants could make the same case.
As a group, veterans' main post-war disadvantage stemmed from their low
levels of education rather than official neglect. Most veterans had, at best,
primary schooling. 89 To what extent did veterans' war participation lead, as
they claim, to lost educational opportunities? Some blacks did continue to
receive an education during the war, either inside the country or overseas.
However, many rural schools closed during the war, either on Rhodesian or
guerrilla orders, disrupting education for school-going black children.
Veterans attending school were not the only group whose education was
disrupted. Moreover, many veterans had already left school when they went
to fight, either because their parents could not afford school fees or because
they were unable to get into the small number of secondary schools for
blacks. Racially discriminatory educational policies affected veterans and
most civilians alike.
The similarities between the politics of veterans' pensions and the
politics of reparations are often quite striking. In particular, the competition
over who suffered most that characterized the debate in Zimbabwe has its
counterparts in reparations politics in other cases. Luc Huyse observes, albeit
in the context of victims of atrocities, that:
It is tempting to see all those who have suffered from violent conflict as
natural allies, even as members of one harmonious family. History,
however, teaches us that victims frequently compete fiercely with each
other for recognition, for material resources such as compensation and
positive discrimination in the areas of housing and education, and for
symbolic goods such as monuments, medals, memorial days and other types
of commemoration.
Most common is competition between victims of the same atrocities.
There are historical studies of the bitter post-World War I struggles
between the various victims of the German invasion in Belgium, France and
the Netherlands. Resistance fighters, forced labourers, persecuted patriots,
and anti-fascists, communists and surviving Jews all tried to represent their
own suffering as greater than that of others and to make their experiences
dominant in the national war memory. The pattern is repeated again and
again in many contexts today. In Burundi, for example, it is usual for Tutsi
89 Id. at 93.
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leaders to boycott the inauguration of any memorial to Hutu victims, and
vice versa. 90
Another commonality between the politics of reparations and veterans'
pensions is that beneficiaries often expect that material recognition will
exceed public welfare assistance and do not want assistance to be seen as
welfare.9 1 In Zimbabwe, veterans unsuccessfully opposed having the
provision of government assistance schemes in terms of the War Veterans
Act of 1992 fall under the social welfare ministry, which they felt
stigmatized them. 92 In behind-the-scenes discussions on this legislation, the
responsible minister expressed support for veterans' belief that because of
their heroic war participation, they should not have to rely on public welfare,
which was far below the poverty datum line.93 Similarly, reparation
payments that do not exceed public welfare or are paid under the auspices of
a welfare ministry often come in for criticism.94
Whether to call veterans' pensions and other state benefits "reparations"
assumes importance only because of a glaring lacunae in the literature on
transitional justice. Transitional justice studies consider reparations as one
90 Luc Huyse, Victims, in RECONCILIATION AFTER VIoLENT CONFLICT: A
HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 64.
91 Vandeginste, supra note 72, at 158 (noting that victims' expectations and
perceptions of reparations may vary widely based on, inter alia, "socio-economic
position, whether they are in exile or not, gender, and the passage of time since the
violations"). In contrast to a common emphasis on victims' expectations for reparations
that exceed public welfare, Minow gives attention to victims whose oppression lowers
their expectations. See MINOW, supra note 74, at 105-06.
92 In the veterans' draft bill, they wanted government schemes of assistance to be
under the Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development rather than the
welfare ministry. War Veterans Investment and Administration Bill, at 1-2 (1992).
Moreover, veterans did not want welfare, they wanted economic empowerment.
93 War Veterans Administration Bill: Memorandum by the Minister of Labour,
Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, at 6-7 (undated).
94 See, e.g., George Hicks, The Comfort Women Redress Movement, in WHEN
SORRY, supra note 74, at 123 (noting that an organization representing comfort women in
South Korea rejected a proposed Japanese relief fund, arguing that it was welfare money
and would signal renewed humiliation for them). They sought individual compensation.
Hicks notes that, among other reasons, the Japanese government-funded reparations plan
that pays each surviving Filipino comfort woman monetary compensation has been
faulted because funds are paid through government welfare agencies in the Philippines,
which makes the money seem more like welfare than reparations. Id. at 124. For the
alleged inadequacy of German government reparation payments to Holocaust survivors,
see Hubert Kim, German Reparations: Institutionalized Insufficiency, in WHEN SORRY,
supra note 74, at 78.
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mechanism to address human rights injustices after the downfall of
authoritarian regimes or the end of wars. Other mechanisms are trials,
purges, and amnesties. Of this repertoire, veterans' benefits most closely
approximate reparations. But the fit is imperfect. Reparations in the
transitional justice literature are usually for civilian victims, the perpetrators
are predecessor governments, and the injustice is usually a legally-based
human rights atrocity. The claims that guerrilla armies and their civilian
supporters might make on successor governments for official recognition of
their unpaid national services and sacrifices are simply ignored. One
possibility is for further evolution in the concept of reparations to
accommodate these groups' claims on the state. It is imperative, though, that
scholars of transitional justice reckon with these groups and their claims in
post-transition societies.
V. CONCLUSION
Liberation war veterans sought official recognition for their unpaid war
services in multiple arenas. This article focused on their pursuit of official
recognition in the arena of pensions. Except for war-disability pensions
which were a government initiative, other pension benefits-recognition of
war service years for state-employed ex-guerrillas for the purposes of
calculating retirement pensions and veterans' compensation payments-were
the product of the ruling party's accommodation of veterans' political
pressures. Likewise, repeated increases in war-disability pensions were also
won through veterans' political bargaining. The ruling party's
accommodation of conflicts with guerrilla veterans over pensions had much
to do with the extent to which its power and legitimacy depended on
veterans' political support. Herein lay the source of veterans' power.
In 1997, veterans inside and outside state institutions joined forces and
extracted from the President a promise of huge compensation payments for
their war services as well as other benefits and a presidential apology for
official neglect. Both because the President conceded these benefits in order
to prevent the downfall of his party and because the veterans' moral claim of
either absolute or relative official neglect is suspect, the case can be made
against understanding these concessions as reparations. Indeed, veterans'
privileged status engendered demands from other groups in society seeking
comparable benefits, notably civilian liberation war groups and the non-war
disabled. The equity issues that veterans' pensions triggered-among
veterans, between veterans and other liberation groups, between veterans and
the ruling elite, and between veterans and workers-made the liberation war
a terrain of endless conflict. Competition over war contributions and rewards
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continuously challenged the ruling party's projects of legitimation and
nation-building, themselves dependent on its version.
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